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Abstract. The main goal of this paper is to show that Pettit and Smith’s (1996) argument con-
cerning the nature of free belief is importantly incomplete. I accept Pettit and Smith’s em-
phasis upon normative constraints governing responsible believing and desiring, and their
claim that the responsibly believing agent needs to possess an ability to believe (or desire)
otherwise when believing (desiring) wrongly. But I argue that their characterization of these
constraints does not do justice to one crucial factor, namely, the presence of an unreflective,
sub-personally constituted, ability to spot the kind of situations in which the reflective criti-
cal abilities constitutive of responsible believing (and desiring) should be deployed.
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In “Freedom in Belief and Desire,” Philip Pettit and Michael Smith (1996)
advance a novel and interesting thesis about what it is to believe and desire
freely. “To hold a belief or desire freely is to hold it in the presence of an ability,
should the belief or desire be wrong, to get it right” (Pettit and Smith 1996, p.
445).1 Only responsible believers and desirers possess this ability. They are
what Pettit and Smith call orthonomous agents (see their 1990, 1993). An
orthonomous agent is someone who is able to recognize the existence of nor-
mative constraints governing her beliefs and desires and, importantly, some-
one capable of responding appropriately to those constraints, by correcting
mistakes when they arise. Pettit and Smith thus endorse – despite philosophi-
cal arguments to the contrary2 – a certain version of the possibility of believ-
ing (and desiring) at will. Furthermore, they support this possibility by arguing
that this ability is what constitutes free will.
The main goal of this paper is to show that Pettit and Smith’s argument is
importantly incomplete. I accept Pettit and Smith’s emphasis upon normative
constraints governing responsible believing and desiring. But I shall argue that
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their characterization of these constraints does not do justice to one crucial
factor, namely, the unreflective, sub-personally constituted, ability to spot the
kind of situations in which the reflective critical abilities constitutive of re-
sponsible believing (and desiring) should be deployed. The spirit of my pa-
per is thus sympathetic, but aims at an important elaboration of the idea of
believing responsibly. To this end, I develop a notion that I’d like to call “criti-
cal pop-out”. The idea, in a nutshell, is that in order to believe responsibly,
the agent should be skilled at automatically detecting the kind of situations in
which the critical abilities crucial to responsible believing should be deployed.
The process of spotting these situations must (on pain of regress) be automatic.
The critically sensitive situations must simply “pop-out” to the doxastically
responsible subject. To see how this proposal differs from, but ultimately
complements, Pettit and Smith’s account, let me first present some of their
own considerations regarding free thought.
Evidential norms
Responsible believers are to be located within what Pettit and Smith call the
conversational stance. It is within this stance, i.e. within the realm of intel-
lectually oriented conversations, that people make certain assumptions about
themselves and about one another. Central among these assumptions are the
ideas that (a) the beliefs we form bear on common questions; (b) everyone
has a certain authority regarding her own beliefs, and (c) when disagreement
occurs, it would usually disappear as a consequence of reviewing the support-
ing evidence. Finally, people also assume that everyone who engages in con-
versation shares these ideas. The resulting picture has a certain Gricean flavor,
in the sense that for rational conversation to work in the way it does, every-
one has to believe that everyone else also believes these assumptions to be
operative (Pettit and Smith 1996, pp. 430–431).
In order to adopt the conversational stance, an additional and important re-
quirement is needed. The orthonomous, i.e., the responsibly believing agent
also needs to possess a self-starting version of the aforementioned ability to
believe (or desire) otherwise when believing (desiring) wrongly. That is to say,
the agent should be able not only appropriately to respond to the normative
requirement of e.g., modifying his belief/desire vis-à-vis the evidence or ar-
guments presented by others, but should also be able to respond appropriately
to evidence/arguments “he will often be in a position to produce himself” (Pettit
and Smith 1996, p. 447). The adoption of the conversational stance is thus
not restricted to the standard idea of exchange of reasons in conversation
3FREE BELIEF
among different people. Intrapersonal conversation, i.e., the kind of reflec-
tion a person alone can engage in when assessing matters or trying to make
decisions also belongs, and importantly so, to the conversational stance. The
ability to correct errors as a result of self-presented considerations is thus
an important part of what makes an agent a responsible believer, i.e., an
orthonomous agent.
Pettit and Smith are very clear about the conditions that have to be met for
an agent to be considered a proper conversational interlocutor (either with
herself or with other agents). The conditions are threefold: “there are certain
norms governing what that subject ought to believe, the subject is disposed
to recognize those norms, and she is disposed to respond in the way required”
(Pettit and Smith 1996, p. 436). The norms the authors have in mind when
stating the first of these conditions are related to the kind of evidence that
justifies holding particular beliefs. Given how the world is, it is right to be-
lieve that e.g., “Paris is the capital of France”, wrong to believe otherwise. If
I believe that if p then q, and I also believe that p, then, ceteris paribus, I should
believe that q, etc. Pettit and Smith call these norms evidential norms (although
they are thinking not only of evidence provided by environmental conditions,
but also evidence that accrues as the result of certain inferential steps).
The second condition, namely, that the subject be disposed to recognize
those evidential norms, is probably the most important for present purposes.
To recognize such norms is, according to Pettit and Smith, for the subject to
have beliefs “with contents of the form: it is true that p or it is false that p; the
evidence supports the hypothesis that p or is against the hypothesis that p . . .
To believe that a certain proposition . . . is true or is supported by the evidence
or is entailed by something that is itself accepted is to believe, in effect, that
it is right to believe the proposition, wrong to disbelieve it” (Pettit and Smith
1996, p. 434). Finally, the responsible believer should be able to act upon such
a recognition of norms, i.e., she should “be disposed to maintain beliefs that
comply with the norms and to reject beliefs that fail to do so” ( p. 435). When
these three conditions are met, Pettit and Smith claim, we can say of the agent
that she enjoys free thought, because she possesses the ability to get her be-
liefs right, should they be wrong.
In thus discussing the possibility of believing responsibly (and hence freely),
Pettit and Smith neatly sidestep the traditional question of whether or not an
agent has control over possible alternatives concerning what to believe – an
issue which has played a central role in most discussions of believing at will.3
The right question, it is argued, cannot be whether the agent has free choice
over what to believe, since if the agent has done everything right, there is no
value whatsoever in having the choice of being wrong! We do not believe re-
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sponsibly because we freely choose to believe p instead of q. Rather, we are
said to freely choose to believe p because we meet other conditions for re-
sponsible believing, namely, the conditions stated above.
This kind of move is, of course, not new in the literature. The idea that
responsibility is a precondition of choice or voluntary control rather than the
other way round echoes some of Strawson’s claims in “Freedom and Resent-
ment” (1974), even though Strawson is there discussing moral, and not, as if
were, doxastic responsibility. The idea is also related to Dennett’s take on the
issue of control and the so-called “could have done otherwise” principle in
discussions of free will (Dennett 1984). The “could have done otherwise” prin-
ciple can only be sensibly interpreted, Dennett claims, as the possibility of a
properly functioning agent modifying her actions in the future as the result of
being presently prompted to corrections by the provision of training or feed-
back. Someone “could have done otherwise” only if she is able to learn from
the current outcome of her actions; only if she is “cognitively tuneable” so as
to act differently when facing the “same” situation in the future (Dennett 1984,
pp. 139–144).
Importantly, Pettit and Smith distance themselves from this Dennettian point
of view by stressing that on their account, unlike Dennett’s, the reason-laden
character of the requisite tuneability is of the essence.4 Their idea of revision
due to recognition of relevant evidential norms requires the subject to be vigi-
lant at the personal level, whereas Dennett’s view, it is claimed, requires only
a rather passive, mechanical agent. Given the Dennettian model of attitude
formation, the kinds of revisions and adjustments involved in learning to cope
with the demands of evidence and rationalization “may happen within them
[the subjects] without any recognition of why they should happen and with-
out any efforts on their behalf to help them happen” (Pettit and Smith 1996,
p. 441). Pettit and Smith thus depict Dennett’s notion of a subject’s being
“cognitively tuneable” by training or feedback as a potentially fully sub-per-
sonal phenomenon, and reject the relevance of any “adjustments” at that level
for (personal level) questions about responsibly believing.
We can call Pettit and Smith’s criticism of such an image of cognitive change
the sub-personal worry. The worry seems to stem from a deliberately intel-
lectualist view of norm compliance and recognition. On this view, it is insuf-
ficient that the subject be responsive to what the relevant norms require. Rather
the recognition of such normative demands must itself take place within the
conversational stance, i.e., by the subject engaging in conversation with her-
self or with someone else (Pettit and Smith 1996, p. 442). The label “mechani-
cal” applied to Dennett’s account can be unpacked as characterizing a lack of
personal level awareness on the part of the subject. The subject is not aware
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of being governed or having to be governed by the rational demands of evi-
dential norms, and without such cognitive vigilance, there is no room for
responsible believing. It is thus not difficult to see why Dennett’s view is
presented as inadequate. Dennett’s error is not to pay sufficient attention to
the crucial personal level components involved in the requisite norm-sensi-
tivity. Instead, Pettit and Smith end up presenting what might be called a self-
contained model of the normative dimensions. It is self-contained because the
model does not posit any crucial role for sub-personal states in the explana-
tion of attitude formation. Their characterization of how to meet the normative
demands is conceptually independent of any sub-personal level contributions.
In opting for such a self-contained model, Pettit and Smith succumb to a
kind of mirror-image of Dennett’s error. Where Dennett paid insufficient at-
tention to personal level elements, Pettit and Smith, I shall now argue, pay
insufficient attention to the equally crucial role of certain sub-personal com-
ponents to responsible believing. In the rest of the paper I shall argue that unless
we acknowledge a crucial sub-personal component allowing an agent auto-
matically to recognize those situations in which she should actively deploy
her personal level abilities to respect evidential norms, we haven’t provided
a viable characterization of responsible believing. An account of responsible
belief is possible only if we opt for a non self-contained model of how we meet
the normative demands.
I will elaborate these ideas in two stages. First, I shall analyze in more detail
Pettit and Smith’s own account of the recognitional capacities in virtue of
which we are sensitive to certain evidential norms. Second, I shall introduce
and characterize a specific sub-personal component as an additional, and
necessary, condition for responsible believing.
Recognitional capacities
As I pointed out earlier, Pettit and Smith’s account of responsible belief in-
volves the adoption of a conversational stance, which, in turn, requires three
conditions to be met: there need to be belief-relevant norms, the agent must
be capable of recognizing this to be the case, and, finally, the agent must be
able to act upon this recognition.
I want now to concentrate on the second of these three conditions, namely,
the agent’s capacity to recognize evidential norms. In Pettit and Smith’s ac-
count, this recognitional capacity has a dispositional character. There are, of
course, situations in which certain circumstances would prevent the agent from
acting in accordance with such dispositions – inattentiveness, forgetfulness,
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passion, etc. If these circumstances completely block the subject’s abilities to
reason, if they become – to use Pettit and Smith’s terminology – “disabling
obstacles,” then we may withdraw (what they term) our “authorization” of the
subject as a conversational interlocutor. Otherwise, if the obstacles are not thus
disabling, then there remains the possibility of bringing the agent to recog-
nize that her beliefs do not meet relevant norms: ones that she, in general, is
disposed to acknowledge. This is done through the exchange of arguments:
When you authorize someone in conversation, you hold her to the expectation that she
will balk at discrepancies between the two of you, and do so in a way that invites the as-
cription of beliefs like the following: that you each have different belief attitudes toward
the same content, that the evidence available may rule out one of those beliefs as unsup-
ported or false . . . If an interlocutor failed to live up to that expectation, if she failed to
manifest any notion of there being a common content of belief or a common fund of evi-
dence, for example, then you would have no reason to take her attitudes seriously. (Pettit
and Smith 1996, p. 434)
Since conversation is also intrapersonal, the strategy should work along the
same lines in those cases in which the agent has to deliberate by herself, i.e.,
without being prompted by any other agent’s presentation of reasons or argu-
ments. How are we to understand this capacity of an agent to recognize nor-
mative standards when deliberating on her own? Is this kind of capacity based
solely on the agent’s disposition to make, albeit imperfectly, the kind of in-
ferences prescribed by Pettit and Smith’s notion of evidential norms?
It is certainly the case that, especially in processes of decision making, we
find ourselves – as isolated individuals – engaging in the sort of critical proc-
ess that implies having already recognized a particular situation as one requir-
ing the exercise of critical appraisal. However, this realization cannot be fully
characterized in the way Pettit and Smith describe, i.e., as the subject’s sim-
ply manifesting “beliefs involving notions like truth and support and entail-
ment” (Pettit and Smith 1996, p. 434). To do that is to assume that the subject
already has the cognitive ability to appreciate certain situations as requiring
the application of a particular set of inferential principles. It is to assume that
she has the ability to spot certain situations as governed by relevant eviden-
tial norms. In effect, Pettit and Smith just assume that the subject is able to
spot when critical engagement is appropriate. The problem is less obvious
when the conversational stance is understood interpersonally, since one role
of the outside interlocutor is precisely to engage the subject in critical reflec-
tion. But when the individual is her own interlocutor, she needs to be able to
spot those situations in which she ought to engage in critical reflection (simi-
larly, in the interpersonal case, someone has to determine that critical reflec-
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tion and engagement is appropriate). Since we cannot be constantly question-
ing our thoughts and beliefs, and since spotting when we should do so cannot,
on pain of infinite regress, be a matter of actively entertaining or understand-
ing additional inferential principles, we are forced to invoke some kind of
automatic sub-personal component. Thus, Pettit and Smith’s self-contained
model of cognitive vigilance must be rejected.
Critical pop-out
I have argued that to believe responsibly we must not only meet the three
conditions displayed by Pettit and Smith, but must also possess a specific kind
of know-how or skill, namely, the ability to automatically recognize a situa-
tion as one requiring critical appraisal. This skill cannot itself – unlike the in-
tellectual processes it triggers – be reason-based, on pain of infinite regress.
Instead, the situations that require an exercise of the agent’s critical obliga-
tions must simply pop-out to the agent in some non-reasoned, conceptually
unmediated way. I shall call that necessary – but wholly sub-personal – com-
ponent of believing responsibly “critical pop-out”. As befits a kind of know-
how, critical pop-out operates in an automatic fashion and belongs squarely
to the sub-personal level. However, I claim, the very notion of fulfilling one’s
intellectual obligations is unintelligible unless certain situations simply pop-
out to the agent as situations requiring critical reflection. This notion of pop-
out should thus be viewed as the rule-stopper that triggers rule-following
activity conforming to Pettit and Smith’s notion of “an agent’s recognizing
the demands of evidential norms.”5
It might perhaps be objected that a kind of superbeing, with unlimited
mental resources and unlimited time, could be a responsible believer independ-
ently of possessing any capacity of critical pop-out. I am not convinced that
this is so (wouldn’t such a being just persist in an endless spiral of unending
appraisal, meta-appraisal, and so on?) But more importantly, the interesting
philosophical project surely is to understand how agents broadly speaking like
us (i.e., time and resource limited material beings) can count as responsible
believers. And this project, I want to say, requires us to recognize the cognitively
crucial role of the kind of sub-personal mechanism I have described.6 The
conduct essential to responsible believing thus occurs, as Pettit and Smith
rightly insist, at the personal level, but it needs to be linked to the kind of sub-
personal ability that I’ve called “critical pop-out”.
To take a mundane case, consider people who claim they just don’t see (and
hence don’t form the belief) that the trash bag is full, and consequently (too)
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seldom come to believe that the trash needs to be taken out. It is perhaps pos-
sible to imagine a training program for these subjects (some of whom I hap-
pen to know) such that they might learn better to detect full trash bags in their
local environment. In one sense, clearly, the subjects were perfectly able to
see full trash bags before the training. What the training does is to change the
functional poise of certain inputs by engendering a new skill that allows those
situations to automatically and unreflectively strike the subject as ones de-
manding further attention.7
The notion of critical pop-out is thus not to be assimilated to the much sim-
pler notion of (if you like) “novelty pop-out.” Novel situations do, to be sure,
tend to engage our critical and reflective faculties. But the kind of skill I am
envisioning is quite naturally displayed in situations with which we are quite
familiar. Consider, for example, the experienced air traffic controller who
immediately (and just in time) recognizes that her command to drop 300 feet
and turn 30° west would cause a head-on collision, or the logician who spots
the elementary error in her own proof. Of course, we do not always succeed
in identifying such errors. But insofar as we are culpable when we fail to do
so, the preconditions of this culpability include both our possession of the
personal level skills required to meet Pettit and Smith’s three conditions and
of an automatic, sub-personally constituted, capacity to know when such criti-
cal engagement is appropriate. It is only courtesy of this dual constitution, I
suggest, that the buck of responsibility can ever come to rest.
In sum, the normative demands governing the personal level phenomenon
of responsible believing can intelligibly be met only by (finite) beings pos-
sessing the automatic, sub-personal skill I have called “critical pop-out”. The
key role played by conversation at the interpersonal level may seduce us into
thinking that the possession of such a skill is merely an enabling condition,
and one that should not be considered crucial to an account of responsible
believing. But this argument loses its force when we look more closely at the
intrapersonal aspect of the conversational stance. Our ability to correct er-
rors as a result of self-presented considerations depends crucially upon the
additional sub-personal skill of unreflectively spotting those situations which
require our critical engagement.
There is, finally, a more general moral to be drawn from all this. For Pettit
and Smith’s failure to give due philosophical weight to sub-personal activity
is clearly part of a larger pattern. There is a strong tendency in the recent
philosophical literature to view sub-personal factors as merely the enabling
conditions that make certain personal level phenomena possible, but which
play no philosophically interesting role in the accounts then developed.8 This
kind of personal/sub-personal apartheid is supposed to turn on considerations
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of rationality. Pettit and Smith’s sub-personal worry is a case in point. It is
thus an interesting result of the present analysis that at least one of the con-
ceptually crucial conditions for responsible believing turns out to belong to
the sub-personal level. A careful reconsideration of the relations between per-
sonal and sub-personal elements in philosophical account of mental phenom-
ena is, I conclude, seriously overdue.
Notes
1. The idea of a link between freedom and/or rationality and the ability to correct errors is
not itself new. Versions can be found in e.g., Dennett (1984), Frankfurt (1971), Haugeland
(1998), and Strawson (1974).
2. See e.g., Alston (1986), Holton (1994), Hume (1958), James (1948), Montmarquet (1986),
Scott-Kakures (1993), Williams (1973). Winters (1979) argues quite convincingly for
the inconclusiveness of Williams’ arguments.
3. See e.g., Alston (1988, p. 261): “. . .one has control over a given type of state only if
one also has control over some field of incompatible alternatives. To have control over
believing that p is to have control over whether one believes that p or not.”
4. Pettit and Smith do not mention Dennett’s 1984. Their reference is rather to The Inten-
tional Stance (Dennett 1987).
5. As an anonymous referee (whom I thank kindly) reminds me, the discussion here seems
to be related to the issue of phronesis in Aristotle. Aristotle discusses this special type of
practical intelligence in vi 5, 1141 b 8–1142 a 30 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Practical
intelligence or practical wisdom, phronesis is characterized as a perceptual ability to
recognize, in particular cases, what is required of the subject for her to achieve virtue:
“It calls for something like perception to recognize at what point one’s action would be-
come blameworthy” (Sorabji 1980, p. 206). To pursue this connection is, of course,
beyond the limits of this paper. However, it should be noticed that a significant number
of cognitive scientists have found this aspect of Aristotle’s moral philosophy to be enor-
mously fruitful for a defense of a more general, non-sentential and know-how oriented,
model of knowledge (see e.g., Churchland 1996; Clark 2000; Flanagan 1996).
6. For some related ideas concerning the proper objects of epistemological analysis, see
Cherniak’s (1986) treatment of “minimal rationality”.
7. It would be interesting to see how the claim that this subpersonal capacity can be tuned
via learning relates to different species of nativist and non-nativist views in the devel-
opmental literature. It may, of course, be the case that the learning mechanism required
to accomplish this tuning is innate, at least in the sense of not being the outcome of another
learning mechanism previously in place. It would thus turned out to be true that some
subjects are just better at this forward looking tuneability than others. However, noth-
ing in the notion of critical pop-out defended here commits us to a particular view on
this matter.
8. See e.g., Davidson (1980), Dennett (1969), Pylyshyn (1984), Taylor (1964), and espe-
cially McDowell (1994). Bermúdez (2000) is an excellent, critical, discussion of this
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